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Commentary on DPP v. Tiernan 
 
LIZ CAMPBELL 
 
The decision 
 
The decision of the Supreme Court in Director of Public Prosecutions v Tiernan [1988] 
IR 250 reviewed the approach of the Irish courts in imposing a sentence for the crime of 
rape, and rejected the possibility of handing down general sentencing guidelines. The 
appeal against conviction was heard in 1986, while the Supreme Court decision was 
handed down in 1988. This is the rewritten Supreme Court judgment. To set the judgment 
in context, the extant law on definition of rape was Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981, 
section 2 of which provides that a man commits rape if he has unlawful sexual 
intercourse with a woman who does not consent to it and he knows that she does not 
consent to the intercourse or he is reckless as to whether she does or does not consent. 
This is a subjective standard, in that it looks at the actor’s knowledge or recklessness, 
rather than considering a generic objective standard or expectation. To mitigate this 
somewhat, subsection 2 imposes a “reasonable grounds” standard in assessing his belief 
in consent. In other words, the jury must have regard to whether his belief was reasonable 
or not. Moreover, the definition of rape did not include married parties, as the abolition of 
marital exemption in relation to rape did not arrive until the Criminal Law (Rape) 
(Amendment) Act, 1990 (section 5). Furthermore, the provision of a corroboration 
warning was mandatory in all sexual offence trials. Subsequent to the case, section 7 of 
the Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1990 provided that whether or not a warning was necessary 
should be left to the discretion of the trial judge.  
 
Nonetheless, there were some movements towards reform. The Rape Crisis Centre in 
Dublin (endorsed by equivalent centres in Clonmel, Cork, Galway, Limerick and 
Waterford) made submissions to the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Women’s Rights on 
Rape Legislation and investigation Procedures in May 1986, calling for, inter alia, a 
broader definition of rape, criminalisation of rape within marriage, inadmissibility of past 
sexual history and separate legal representation of complainants. Indeed, in their 
subsequent fourth report on Sexual Violence, the Joint Committee on Women’s Rights 
largely accepted and endorsed those recommendations, including that of a broader 
concept of “rape”: stating “the definition of Rape to be broadened to include oral sex, 
anal sex and the use of objects to violate the vagina”.1 
 
As noted in the judgment, this case involved a violent, multiple rape, for which Tiernan 
was sentenced to 21 years imprisonment. The complainant in this case was raped by 
numerous men, and was subjected to what the court described as acts of “sexual 
perversion”. Without belittling the gravity of the harm inflicted on the complainant, the 
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choice of words by the Court is dubious. The notion of “sexual perversion” is seen in 
contrast to the “norm” or the “natural” in sex, but of course this is loaded with negative 
normative content.
2
 The idea of acts themselves being “perverted” is problematic, and 
this appraisal generally is hetero-normative, homophobic and ambiguous. It often 
conveys the particular idea of women’s sexuality as being perverse, and works to 
stigmatise those whose sexual practices or desires diverge from the socially constructed 
conception of normality. Furthermore, it demarcates certain sexual acts as not just 
different but deviant.
3
 The wrong in rape lies in the lack of consent and the sheer 
objectification of the victim;
4
 describing some of the harms committed as perversions is 
superfluous and maintains a patriarchal view of the sexual status quo. 
 
The rather brief judgment of the Supreme Court underlined the gravity of the offence of 
rape, and described both mitigating and aggravating factors that should be considered in 
sentencing. Finlay CJ (at 253) rightly stated: “The crime of rape must always be viewed 
as one of the most serious offences contained in our criminal law even when committed 
without violence beyond that constituting the act of rape itself.” Various factors were 
highlighted to emphasise this gravity: “The act of forcible rape not only causes bodily 
harm but is also inevitably followed by emotional, psychological and psychiatric damage 
to the victim which can often be of long term, and sometimes of lifelong duration” (253). 
While the recognition of the multiplicity of harms is to be welcomed, this statement is 
questionable in a number of respects. First it distinguishes between “types” of rape, 
classifying and arguably ranking these, with “forcible rape” at the apex. Indeed, once 
force or threat of force was necessary to the crime of rape.
5
 Though this has changed, it 
seems a de facto hierarchy remains.
6
 Furthermore, the perceived inevitability of 
subsequent damage leaves little room for the agency of the victim.
7
 A similar concern 
may be raised about the Court’s view that “rape can distort the victim’s approach to her 
own sexuality”. All this underlines the presumptions made about the victim, and the 
sidelining of her capacity and autonomy.
8
  
 
Moreover, rape was seen by the Court as imposing on “the victim a deeply distressing 
fear of sexually transmitted disease and the possibility of a pregnancy and of a birth, 
whose innocent issue could inspire a distress and even a loathing utterly alien to 
motherhood.” This observation emphasises the normative interpretation of maternity and 
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the qualities of the ideal mother, linked to the notion of an ideal woman. As Betty Friedan 
observed, the dominant understanding was that “women could find fulfillment only in 
sexual passivity, male domination, and nurturing maternal love”. 9  In addition, this 
observation of the court underlines the absolute innocence of any subsequent birth. This 
is particularly noteworthy, given the absence of a general right to abortion in Ireland, 
which limits the ability of the raped woman to control or end her pregnancy.
10
  
 
Despite the recognition that rape constitutes “a gross attack upon the human dignity and 
the bodily integrity of a woman and a violation of her human and constitutional rights”, 
and so must attract very severe legal sanctions, the Supreme Court declined to impose 
any sentencing guidelines. This was predicated on the imperative that sentencing judges 
impose a sentence which “in their discretion” meets the particular circumstances of the 
case and of the accused. Thus, Finlay CJ doubted that it would be “appropriate for an 
appellate court to appear to be laying down any standardisation or tariff of penalty for 
cases” (254). 
 
It is positive to see the Supreme Court noting that mitigating circumstances in rape are 
limited (255). The guilty plea was deemed to be the only such circumstance in the current 
case but was regarded as a “significant mitigating factor”, due to its preventing the 
“ordeal” of cross-examination. Certainly, there is an argument to be made that a degree of 
mitigation should be based on an early plea. This is due to the plea possibly denoting 
acceptance of responsibilty, and so as ensuring accountability, which is a key function of 
the criminal trial. Moreover, victims do not necessarily experience a sense of catharsis 
from a full contested criminal trial.
11
 Nonethless, the judgment presupposes that the 
complainant will regard questioning in a negative manner, and does not assess whether a 
trial, the hearing of evidence and its findings of fact may in fact be valuable, affirming, or 
cathartic for some complainants.   
 
The Court stated that a lack of premeditation is not a mitigating circumstance, and should 
be described more aptly as “the absence of aggravating circumstance”. Furthermore, the 
Court emphasised that neither the victim’s previous sexual experience nor her imprudent 
self-exposure to the danger of rape could be considered mitigating circumstances. That 
this even needs to be said is regrettable. Moreover, the choice of the words “imprudence” 
and “self-exposure” casts judgement on the woman, and undermines the culpability and 
choice of the offender. Referring to “the danger of rape” reframes the issue as one that 
seems inexorably occurring, rather than as actions chosen and perpetrated by autonomous 
men. In seeking to ensure that sexual experience and behaviour do not mitigate, the 
Court’s unfortunate choice of words still reproaches the victim.  
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Crucially, the Court in Tiernan examined the possibility of a non-custodial sentence for 
rape conviction. The Chief Justice stated that while a judge must impose a sentence 
which meets the particular circumstances of the case and of the accused person, “it is not 
easy to imagine the circumstance which would justify departure from a substantial 
immediate custodial sentence for rape”. He stressed that they would be “wholly 
exceptional.” So, a non-custodial sentence is not precluded, though should be wholly 
exceptional. 
 
Throughout the judgment a clear retributive leaning is evident, though there is also some 
rehabilitative rhetoric. Moreover, the underpinning constitutional principle of 
proportionality requires the sentence to be cognisant of the offence but also the offender’s 
personal circumstances (State (Healy) v Donoghue [1976] IR 325). This permeates the 
judgment and informs its conclusion.  
 
Application of Tiernan 
 
Subsequent cases indicate the implications of this decision, in particular the viewing of a 
guilty plea as a “significant mitigating factor”. For instance, in DPP v G [1994] 1 IR 587 
the accused pleaded guilty to rape, and was sentenced to twelve concurrent sentences of 
life imprisonment. The Supreme Court reduced the sentence to one of fifteen years’ 
imprisonment, referring to Tiernan in so doing. Tiernan was also applied in DPP v WC 
[1994] ILRM 321, where WC pleaded guilty to the rape of the complainant with whom 
he had a pre-existing relationship. Tiernan ultimately permitted the handing down of a 
suspended sentence in this instance.  
 
It is worth noting that s29 of the Criminal Justice Act 1999 now provides that a court, in 
determining what sentence to pass on a person who has pleaded guilty, shall take into 
account, if it considers it appropriate to do so, the stage at which and the circumstances in 
which he indicated an intention to plead guilty. This section overturns suggestions in the 
aforementioned case law that as a matter of principle a discount must be given for an 
early plea of guilty. 
 
The feminist judgment 
 
The contributions of the feminist judgment are manifold, not least as it would guard 
against decisions such as WC. As is explored more fully below, the key aspects are the 
foregrounding of the victim and the development of sentencing guidelines. Throughout, 
the feminist judgment grapples with the tensions that exist between judicial independence 
and consistency. Indeed, it has been argued that the notion of independence in fact may 
be a façade for male bias.
12
 This issue resonates widely, not just in the Irish context, or in 
the context of sentencing of sexual offences, but it is particularly pressing in this 
jurisdiction given the extent to which judicial discretion is protected. Indeed, the Irish 
system of sentencing has been described as one of the most unstructured in the common-
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law world.
13
 The fact that this is not just a feminist issue, but a broader ideological one, 
underlines the resistance to sentencing guidelines, though this is slowly beginning to 
change. More recently, in People (DPP) v Drought
14
 the High Court assessed and 
categorised rape sentences, looking at “lenient”, “ordinary”, and “severe” punishments. 
In considering “ordinary punishments”, which were seen to range from three to eight 
years, Charleton J noted that “In attempting to discover whether there is a normal 
sentence for rape, my view on this matter is one based on research and is not the 
establishment of, much less the declaration of, a norm”. 15  moreover, the Court of 
Criminal Appeal in People (DPP) v Ryan interpreted Tiernan to permit guidance to be 
given on appropriate sentence ranges for certain offences, with due allowance made for 
any exceptional circumstances.
16
 
 
The underpinning value in the feminist judgment is that of the autonomy of the 
complainant. This foregrounding of autonomy is crucial, as the trial process and in 
particular a guilty plea can be disempowering. Moreover, the feminist judgment stresses 
that victims should not be viewed as an homogeneous class or categorisation, and that 
their experiences, reactions and interests are not uniform or necessarily consistent.
17
 A 
more recent related development is the introduction of separate legal representation for 
the complainant,
18
 which goes some way to meeting these concerns. 
 
The nature and dimensions of harm are explained, with pregnancy and disease not going 
to the gravity of harm. The feminist judgment highlights that there is no distinction 
between stranger/non-stranger rape, and highlights the paradox that while these are 
statistically less common cases, they are seen as stereotypical. The Rape Crisis Network 
Ireland notes that of the people who attended Rape Crisis Centres for counselling and 
support in 2014, 93% of the perpetrators were known to the victim/survivor.
19
 
 
The most radical component of the feminist judgment is the introduction of sentencing 
guidelines for rape cases, and the pronouncement that a sentencing court is not precluded 
from imposing the maximum sentence in respect of a guilty plea. Strict sentencing 
guidelines would not be constitutional in Ireland, given that the principle of 
proportionality in sentencing is “a well-established tenet of Irish constitutional law”.20 
Instead, a scheme of principled discretion is advocated in the judgment. The delineation 
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of some guidelines and the affirmation that imprisonment is the norm is hugely 
significant, given the communicative function and capacity of the criminal trial and 
sentencing.
21
 This prompts us to reflect on the audience and recipient of the judgment, 
and also of guidelines. Guidelines are a statement to judges in future sentencing contexts, 
but also to the community, and to victims. And guidelines in this context represent a 
statement about all of these, insofar as they indicate (how) judges need to be guided; they 
illustrate how we constitute our community’s rules; they recognise this (and other) 
victim’s experiences, and they acknowledge the harm caused to women.  
 
Nonethless, if feminism is to be true to its critical and radical roots it needs to be sceptical 
of what the criminal justice system can deliver to victims in terms of accountability. 
Though the criminal law and the overall process is of great practical and symbolic 
significance, it is just one component in the societal treatment of victims. The role and 
possible interventions from victims are limited, and of course much harmful and criminal 
sexual violence is never detected, not least prosecuted.
22
  
 
Finally, it is striking that the feminist desire for recognition of the harms inherent in and 
caused by rape through robust punishment sometimes maps onto retributive inclinations. 
This leads to the co-opting or the compromising of feminism for punitive purposes, in 
what can be regarded as “carceral feminism”.23 A careful path must be navigated in 
addressing this tension, lest the progressive and positive aspects of feminism become 
associated with punitive law and order policies that demand lengthy imprisonment in 
inappropraite cases. The feminist judgment addresses this concern adeptly, in providing a 
comprehensive and detailed account to guide the application of principled discretion. And 
the feminist judgment still imposes a sentence that is longer than average life term. The 
sentencing guidelines maintain the capacity to mitigate due to the particular 
circumstances of the offender,  and the expression of real remorse with a desire for 
rehabilitation.  
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